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ABSTRACT
We examine the effect of financial dependence on acquisition and investment within existing
industries by single-segment and conglomerate firms for industries undergoing different long run
changes in industry conditions. Conglomerates and single-segment firms differ more in rates of
within-industry acquisitions than in capital expenditure rates, which are similar across organizational
type. In particular, 36 percent of within-industry growth by conglomerate firms in growth industries
is from intra-industry acquisitions, compared to nine percent for single segment firms. Financial
dependence, a deficit in a segment’s internal financing, decreases the likelihood of within-industry
acquisitions and opening new plants, especially for single-segment firms. These effects are mitigated
for conglomerates in growth industries. The findings persist after controlling for firm size and
segment productivity. Acquisitions lead to increased efficiency as plants acquired by conglomerate
firms in growth industries increase in productivity post acquisition. The results are consistent with
the  comparative advantages of different firm organizations differing across long-run industry
conditions.
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1 Introduction
An inﬂuential body of research has argued that industries go through life-cycle stages and that these stages
are characterized by marked diﬀerences in investment and restructuring activity (Gort and Klepper (1982),
Jovanovic (1982), Klepper and Grady (1990), Klepper (1996)). The evidence suggests that changes in the
number of ﬁrms in an industry occur at times of transition in an industry’s life cycle when the competitive
advantage among producers is changing. However it is not known whether and how ﬁrm organization is
associated with ﬁrm performance for industries that experience diﬀerent changes in long-run conditions.
In this paper we examine whether long-term changes in industry conditions aﬀect investment by single-
industry ﬁrms and divisions of conglomerate (multi-segment) ﬁrms diﬀerently. We focus on two factors
that have been identiﬁed in the literature as giving multi-division ﬁrms an advantage in some competitive
environments: access to internal capital markets and the ability to restructure stemming from a greater
propensity to participate in the market for mergers and acquisitions. Speciﬁcally we ask:
• Does ﬁrm organization aﬀect capital intra-industry acquisitions, plant births and deaths?
• Does the eﬀect of organizational structure on ﬁrms’ investment decisions depend on long-run industry
conditions?
• Do diﬀerences in ﬁrm organization and industry conditions aﬀect whether ﬁrms’ investment decisions
depend on shortfalls in cash ﬂows from operations?
In studying ﬁrm organization, we distinguish between single-segment ﬁrms and conglomerate ﬁrms
operating in multiple industries. These two types of ﬁrms are likely to have diﬀerent access to ﬁnancial
resources (public markets and internal capital markets) and diﬀerent types of monitoring (within ﬁrm
hierarchies versus monitoring by external providers of capital). Moreover, the categorization builds on pre-
vious research that has established the importance of a division’s position within its ﬁrm on its investment
policy, eﬃciency, extent of internal monitoring, and access to internal capital markets.1
1Early authors include Lang and Stulz (1994) and Berger and Ofek (1995). We discuss the other papers in this literature
that are related to this paper in Section 2.
1We classify industries into four diﬀerent long-run categories: (1.) Growth industries in which the
long-run industry shipments and the long-run number of ﬁrms are increasing and with changes for each of
these factors both above the median industry change, (2.) Consolidating industries in which the change
in the long-run shipments is above the median industry change but the change in the number of ﬁrms is
below the median. (3.) Technological change industries in which the change in long-run demand is below
the median industry change but the change in the number of ﬁrms is above, (4.) Declining industries
in which the change in long-run demand and the long-run number of ﬁrms are both below the median
industry change. The industry categories diﬀer in the amount of restructuring (closings and acquisitions
of business segments) and growth opportunities.
We ﬁnd the within-industry acquisition behavior of conglomerate segments diﬀers sharply from that
of single-segment ﬁrms, even controlling for the productivity, public ﬁr ms t a t u s ,a n dt h es i z eo ft h ep u r -
chaser. Segments of conglomerate ﬁr m sa r et w ot ot h r e et i m e sm o r el i k e l yt oa c q u i r ep l a n t sw i t h i nt h e i r
existing industries than are single-segment ﬁrms. In particular, 36 percent of within-industry growth
by conglomerate ﬁrms in growth industries is from intra-industry acquisitions compared to nine percent
for single-segment ﬁrms. Acquisition rates also signiﬁcantly diﬀer across long-run industry conditions.
Within-industry acquisitions by conglomerate segments in Growth industries represent a much higher per-
centage (ten percentage points higher) of total ﬁrm growth than acquisitions in Declining industries. In
contrast to these ﬁndings, capital expenditures, which are typically the focus the prior research, vary less
across organizational types and industry conditions.
We examine whether the diﬀerences in within-industry acquisition rates and investment by diﬀerent
types of ﬁrm organizations are related to ﬁnancial dependence. We deﬁne as ﬁnancially dependent those
business segments (single-segment ﬁrms or segments of conglomerates) that spend more than their cash
ﬂow from operations on capital expenditures.2 We test whether the eﬀect of ﬁnancial dependence on acqui-
sitions and investment diﬀe r sf o rc o n g l o m e r a t e sa n ds i n g l e - s e g m e n tﬁrms. We control for the endogeneity
of organizational form and ﬁnancial dependence. To control for potential endogeneity between capital
expenditures and realized the cash ﬂow from operations, in our empirical tests we examine how segments
respond to predicted ﬁnancial dependence rather than observed ﬁnancial dependence.
We ﬁnd ﬁnancially dependent segments tend to fall into two categories: segments that are less pro-
ductive compared to other segments in their industries and very productive segments in high growth
industries.3 We have three major ﬁndings that show how ﬁnancial dependence and organizational form
2Thus, a segment that has an internal ﬁnancial deﬁcit in a year must rely on cash ﬂows from outside the segment or on
the liquidation of its assets to fund capital expenditures at the plants it owns.
3T h et e r mp r o d u c t i v ei sd e ﬁned below and refers to ﬁrms ability to produce revenue from inputs at the segment level.
2aﬀect ﬁrm acquisition and investment over diﬀerent long-run industry conditions:
First, we ﬁnd that predicted ﬁnancial dependence aﬀects plant acquisitions and investment by conglom-
erate segments and single-segment ﬁrms diﬀerently. Financial dependence has a negative eﬀect on capital
expenditures and the probability of acquisitions. In Growth and Consolidation industries, conglomerate
ﬁrms have a positive oﬀsetting eﬀect on within-industry acquisitions.4
Second, we show that the eﬀects of ﬁrm organization on reducing ﬁnancial dependence in Growth
industries are concentrated in conglomerate ﬁrms’ most productive segments. For conglomerate ﬁrms’
most productive segments, ﬁnancial dependence has only a limited eﬀect on within-industry acquisitions.
Moreover, in Growth industries, business segments of conglomerates have a signiﬁcantly higher probability
of acquiring plants within existing industries if the conglomerate also has a less productive main division
in a declining industry. We also ﬁnd that plants acquired by conglomerate ﬁrms - in particular in Growth
industries - signiﬁcantly increase in productivity post-acquisition. These results are consistent with models
that stress the beneﬁts of conglomerate form for the ﬁrms that adopt it, such Stein’s (1997) model of the
beneﬁts of internal capital markets and the predictions about the eﬃcient reallocations of assets within
conglomerate ﬁrms in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). These results are not consistent with models that
predict subsidization of poorly performing divisions or divisions with poor growth prospects. The results
are also not consistent with agency or empire building models that predict ineﬃcient expansion.
Third, we also ﬁnd large diﬀerences in the eﬀect of organizational form on plant birth and exit across
industry categories. In Growth industries, a segment’s predicted ﬁnancial deﬁcit reduces the probability
that a single-segment ﬁrm will open a new plant, while this eﬀect is mitigated for conglomerate ﬁrms.
However, we do not ﬁnd similar eﬀects on plant births in declining industries.
We ﬁnd that plant exit diﬀers across industry categories. Conglomerate ﬁrms are the least likely to close
plants when their current segment is predicted to have a ﬁnancial deﬁcit in Declining industries. In Growth
industries the relation between predicted ﬁnancial dependence and plant exit is similar for conglomerate
and single-segment ﬁrms - in contrast to the positive eﬀect of conglomerate ﬁrms on acquisitions and plant
birth.
These ﬁndings of decreased ﬁnancial dependence for conglomerate ﬁrm acquisitions and plant births
are consistent with conglomerates having experience in allocating resources and integrating operations.
It does not necessarily mean that conglomerate ﬁrms sell at a premium or discount in the market relative to single-segment
ﬁrms.
4Results in an earlier working paper version of this paper also show that the eﬀect of conglomerate ﬁrm status was robust
to whether the ﬁrm was publicly traded. Public ﬁrm status did have an additional positive eﬀect on mitigating the eﬀect of
ﬁnancial dependence on acquisitions by public ﬁrms in Growth industries. However, this eﬀect was much smaller in magnitude
than the eﬀect of conglomerate ﬁrm status.
3This positive beneﬁt of internal capital markets is the highest for conglomerate ﬁrms in Growth industries
- where the value of reallocating assets is likely to be the highest.
There are several key diﬀerences between our approach and the existing literature on investment and
internal capital markets. First, we relate the ﬁrm’s investment and ﬁnancing needs to long-run changes in
industry conditions. We show that long-run industry conditions are of primary importance to understand-
ing the impact of organizational form on acquisitions and plant opening decisions. Second, the existing
literature, with the exception of Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Schoar (2002), has examined the
relation between capital expenditures and ﬁrm organization. We deﬁne investment more generally than
the existing literature to encompass acquisitions of plants and assets. Thus, we can examine whether ﬁrm
organization aﬀects investment through acquisition and plant openings diﬀerently than regular investment.
Since acquisitions require extensive organizational skill in integrating operations while capital expenditures
represent decisions to existing operations, we examine whether the eﬀects of organizational form are greater
for acquisitions than capital expenditures at existing plants.5 T h i r d ,w ea r ea l s oa b l et oo b t a i nd i r e c t
estimates of the productivity of each business unit, whether it is independent or part of a larger ﬁrm.
Thus, we can determine whether the relation between ﬁrms’ investment and their organizational structure
depends on their productivity and we can examine ex post changes in underlying productivity of transacted
assets.
We use data from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), maintained by the Center for Economic
Studies at the Bureau of the Census. The LRD database contains detailed plant-level data for manufactur-
ing plants. There are several advantages to this database: First, it covers both public and private ﬁrms in
manufacturing industries. Second, coverage is at the plant level, and output is assigned by plants at the
four-digit SIC code level. Thus, ﬁrms that produce under multiple SIC codes are not assigned to just one
industry. Third, plant-level coverage means that we can track plants even as they change owners. The
database contains a plant-level code that identiﬁes when plants change ownership. These features are key
to our study as they allow us to identify plants that have changed hands from year-to-year.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two describes the prior literature and why ﬁrm
organization may have a diﬀerential impact over the industry life cycle. Section three introduces our
methodology and Section four describes the data. The results are discussed in Section ﬁve. Section six
concludes.
5GE, for example, has an extensive staﬀ whose job function is to evaluate acquisitions.
42 Industry Conditions and Firm Organization
Studies of industry evolution, by Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper and Grady (1990) among others,
show that many industries go through life-cycle stages. These stages are characterized by diﬀerences in
the growth rates of the industry and by dramatic changes in the numbers of producers in the industry.
As the nature of competition and the comparative advantage of ﬁr m sm a ys h i f ta c r o s ss t a g e s ,m a n y
industries undergo periods of intensiﬁed competition and consolidation when many, perhaps the majority,
of the producers are weeded out. Firm strategies that work in times of expansion, such as preemptively
acquiring large capital intensive plants, may lead to a competitive disadvantage in decline (Ghemawat
(1984), Ghemawat and Nalebuﬀ (1985)). Thus these articles emphasize the importance of industry
conditions on ﬁrms survival, and by extension on their capital budgeting decisions.
To examine the relation between the number of producers and industry growth, we ﬁrst present some
exploratory evidence on long-run industry conditions using Census Bureau data. We classify industries
using Census Bureau data for the years 1972 and 1997. These years are used because they span 25 years of
industry experience and are census years covering all ﬁrms. In Figure 1, we classify industries according
to the growth in the real value of shipments.6 We examine changes in the number of ﬁrms for diﬀerent
long-run changes in demand, using the change in the real value (1982 dollars) of shipments by three-digit
SIC code. We split industries by the highest and lowest quartiles of real value of ﬁrm shipment growth
and graph the long-run changes in the number of ﬁrms. In our subsequent tests, we further split these
industries by the long-run change in the number of producers into “Declining” and “Technological Change”











Contracting Industries (“Declining” and “Technological Change”) 
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Growing Industries (“Growth” and “Consolidation”) 
Long-Run Log Change in Number of Firms by Industry




6We later discuss results using classiﬁcations based on 10-year intervals.
5The histograms show that in growing industries it is not uncommon to see a net increase of 30% in the
number of producers and also for some industries a decline in the number of producers over the sample
period. Whereas in contracting industries a 30% decrease is common.
T h ef a c tt h a tt h en u m b e ro fﬁrms can decrease even in a growing industry, suggest that some ﬁrms may
not possess the resources and / or skills necessary to survive. The resources and skills a ﬁrm requires to
prosper in these diﬀerent types of industries are likely to diﬀer. In a growing industry, new producers are
entering at high rates. Given that entrants are often high cost producers (Jovanovic (1982)), established
ﬁrms in this industry type are less likely to face hard competition. Success in this type of industry is likely
to depend on the ability to marshal resources to take advantage of growth opportunities. In a consolidating
industry, the shipments are also growing rapidly but the competitive pressure is likely to be stronger. In
these industries new producers are less likely to be entering and some existing producers might be forced
out. We would expect that competitive advantages from belonging to a larger organization is likely to be
most valuable in a fast growing consolidating industry.
Numerous studies suggest that the ﬁrm’s organizational structure aﬀects the way it invests, grows, and
sells assets. Conglomerates have internal capital markets that can transfer capital across industries and
may have better access to external capital markets than would be available to their constituent divisions if
they had remained independent (Bolton and Scharfstein (1991), Khanna and Tice (2001), Stein (1997)). In
particular, Stein (1997) models how conglomerate ﬁrms can eﬃciently transfer resources from unproﬁtable
to proﬁtable projects. Moreover, as Peyer (2001) shows empirically, conglomerates have superior ability
to obtain external ﬁnancing, giving divisions of conglomerates a competitive advantage when internally
generated funds are not suﬃcient to ﬁnance desired investment. Thus, we would expect the investment
by segments of conglomerates to be less aﬀe c t e db yt h el e v e lo fi n t e r n a lﬁnancing than equivalent single
segment ﬁrms.
The eﬀect of conglomerate structure on investment need not be benign. One strand of the literature
posits that the ﬁrm’s investment policy is driven by opportunistic agents (usually the managers or the
owners of a subset of the ﬁrm’s securities), who attempt to distort the policy for their private beneﬁt( s e e ,
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986)). Thus, for example, managers may have a private beneﬁt
from investment in capacity (Jensen (1986) and Matsusaka and Nanda (2001)). Opportunistic behavior
by agents may cause the ﬁrms to misallocate resources across industry segments. These possibilities are
suggested by Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000), and Scharfstein
and Stein (2000).
More generally, organizational form may be endogenously determined by a ﬁrm’s expertise and its
6ability to exploit opportunities as argued by Campa and Kedia (2003), Maksimovic and Phillips (2002)
and Villalonga (2004). Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) argue that conglomerates diﬀer from single-segment
ﬁrms because their organizational skills are not industry speciﬁc and that because of this they ﬁnd it optimal
to operate in several industries. In their model ﬁrm size and scope of operations adjust to economize on
the ﬁrms’ organizational talent. In this view as industries experience demand and technology shocks, ﬁrms’
comparative advantage shifts. Conglomerates and single-industry ﬁrms shifts and ﬁrms adjust by building,
acquiring or closing plants to maximize value.7. Because their model predicts a positive correlation between
conglomerates’ divisions size and productivity, the adjustments to shocks may depend on the relative size
of a division within the conglomerate.
The tasks performed by a head oﬃce of a conglomerate are likely to diﬀer across industry types. In
Growth industries the head oﬃce of a multi-segment ﬁrm is faced with managing and providing resources
for increases in capacity. In Declining industries the focus is likely to be on optimally shrinking operations
and reallocating resources to other segments. In Technological Change industries ﬁrms have to adapt to
increasing competition from new entrants in industries with slowly growing or declining shipments, while
in Consolidation industries the decision is whether to remain in the industry. Since the nature of these
t a s k si n v o l v e sad i ﬀerent mixture of monitoring, winner picking, and ﬁnancing, the comparative advantage
of internal capital markets relative to public markets may diﬀer across these long-run industry conditions.
In our tests we ﬁrst examine the extent of diﬀerences the extent to which conglomerates mitigate the
eﬀects of resource constraints across these types of industries. The above discussion suggests that the eﬀects
of conglomerate status should be stronger in growing industries. Consider a growth industry in which ﬁrms
encounter repeated expansion opportunities. Much of the value of such ﬁrms consists of unexploited, and
therefore intangible growth opportunities. Corporate ﬁnance theory suggests that such ﬁrms are most likely
to incur agency and asymmetric information costs when obtaining external ﬁnance (e.g., Myers (1977),
Myers and Majluf (1984)). Internal capital markets are thus most likely to be of value in segments in
growing industries.8 Thus, the ﬁrst hypothesis that we investigate is the following:
H1: The eﬀects of conglomerate status on mitigating the eﬀects of ﬁnancial dependence are greater in
growing industries.
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show that conglomerate segments reallocate resources from less pro-
ductive divisions to more productivity divisions when positive demand shocks are realized. Investment
7While not focusing on the industry life cycle, Bernardo and Chowdhry (2002) model how diﬀerential skills and opportunities
over the ﬁrm’s life endogenously causes a conglomerate discount given that as the ﬁrm matures it exercises its growth options.
8See, for example, Fluck and Lynch (1999).
7decisions by conglomerate ﬁrms in one industry may creates opportunity costs for investments in other
industries in which they operate. Thus segments’ investment decisions depend on the relative demand
growth across industries. In our context, we hypothesize that conglomerate segments are more likely to
exploit investment opportunities in growth industries if their other segments are in declining industries.
This prediction is summarized in the following hypothesis:
H2: The eﬀects of conglomerate status on mitigating the eﬀects of ﬁnancial dependence are greater
in growing industries when conglomerate ﬁrms have productive segments in growing industries and other
large divisions in declining industries.
Conglomerates operating across multiple industries have experience in allocating resources and inte-
grating operations. Since acquisitions require extensive organizational skill in integrating operations, while
capital expenditures typically represent incremental additions to existing operations, we would expect that
diﬀerences in organizational form aﬀect acquisitions more than capital expenditures at existing plants. In
particular, conglomerates’ ability to integrate diﬀerent business units and allocate capital can increase the
payoﬀ to providing capital for acquisitions to segments of conglomerate ﬁrms compared to single-segment
ﬁrms, while capital expenditures may involve similar decisions and skills for both conglomerate and single-
segment ﬁrms. We test whether conglomerates and single-segment ﬁrms that have a ﬁnancial deﬁcit
allocate funds for acquisitions and capital expenditures at existing plants diﬀerently. We thus test the
following hypothesis:
H3: The eﬀects of organizational form and ﬁnancial dependence are greater for acquisitions than for
capital expenditures.
The eﬀect of ﬁnancial dependence on conglomerate segments and single-segment ﬁrms may diﬀer be-
cause conglomerates eﬃciently provide resources to segments with insuﬃcient internal resources that permit
them to make value increasing acquisitions. However, it is also possible that conglomerate segments over-
invest in acquisitions, perhaps due to agency reasons. While we cannot measure the private value created
by acquisitions, which depends on the price paid, we can examine the subsequent changes in the acquired
assets’ productivity. Increases in productivity are consistent with the hypothesis that the acquisitions are
economically eﬃcient. We would expect these eﬀects to be particularly important in growing industries.
We test these predictions in the following hypothesis:
H4: Acquisitions by conglomerate ﬁrms result in increases in productivity of acquired segments. The
increases in productivity are greatest in growth industries.
8Organizational form and ﬁnancial dependence may also aﬀect other capital budgeting decisions. We also
examine how ﬁrms’ decisions to close plants and to build new plants are aﬀected by ﬁnancial dependence
and organizational form across industry conditions.
3 Data, Long-Run Industry Conditions and Variable Construction
In this section we describe the data, how we classify long-run industry conditions and how we calculate
the variables used to test our hypotheses. The primary dependent variables we investigate are a ﬁrm’s
within-industry acquisitions of other plants and its segment-level capital expenditures. We also examine
plant births and exits. Our ﬁrst dependent variable, within-industry acquisition, takes on the value of one
at the segment level if the conglomerate segment or stand-alone ﬁrm purchases one or more plants in that
existing industry, and the value of zero otherwise. Our second measure, capital expenditures, measures
plant-level capital expenditures at the plants owned by each ﬁrm at the beginning of each year and not
sold during the year.
The primary independent variables we use are segment and plant productivity, the long-run change in
aggregate industry conditions, and predicted ﬁnancial dependence and organizational structure.
3.1 Data
We use data from the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), maintained by the Center for Economic
Studies at the Bureau of the Census. The LRD database contains detailed plant-level data on the value of
shipments produced by each plant, investments broken down by equipment and buildings, and the number
of employees.9
The LRD tracks approximately 50,000 manufacturing plants every year in the Annual Survey of Man-
ufactures (ASM). The ASM covers all plants with more than 250 employees. Smaller plants are randomly
selected every ﬁfth year to complete a rotating ﬁve-year panel. Note that while the annual data is called
the Annual Survey of Manufactures, reporting is not voluntary for large plants and is not voluntary once
as m a l l e rﬁrm is selected to participate. All data has to be reported to the government by law and ﬁnes
are levied for misreporting.
T h ed a t aw eu s ec o v e r st h ep e r i o d1974 to 2000. To be in our sample, ﬁrms must have manufacturing
operations producing products in SIC codes 2000-3999. Since we construct measures of productivity
(described in section 3.3) using 5 years of data, our regressions cover the period 1979-2000. We require
9For a more detailed description of the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD) see McGuckin and Pascoe (1988) and also
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002).
9each plant to have a minimum of three years of data. For each ﬁrm, we also exclude all its plants in an
industry (at the three-digit SIC code) if the ﬁrm’s total value of shipments in the industry is less than $1
million in real 1982 dollars.
The database also identiﬁes plants that change ownership. For ownership change we rely on this
identiﬁcation which was available for all years except 1978 (for an unknown reason coverage codes did not
identify ownership change in this year). Plant birth and death were identiﬁed by John Haltiwanger using
payroll records from the Longitudinal Business Database.10
To obtain a measure of organizational structure, we aggregate each ﬁrm’s plant-level data into ﬁrm
industry segments at the three-digit SIC code. We call these industry ﬁrm-level portfolios of plants
“segments.” Segments, deﬁned this way, capture all the plant-level operations of a ﬁrm in an industry.11
We classify ﬁrms as single segment or multiple segment, based on the three-digit SIC code. We classify a
ﬁrm as a multi-segment ﬁrm if it produces more than 10 percent of its sales in a second SIC code outside
its principal three-digit SIC code. Using the 10 percent cut-oﬀ facilitates comparison with previous studies
as 10 percent is the cut-oﬀ that public ﬁrms report. For multiple-segment ﬁrms, we also classify each
segment as either a main segment or a peripheral segment. Main segments are segments whose value of
s h i p m e n t si sa tl e a s t2 5 %o ft h eﬁrm’s total shipments. Given we calculate growth rates and also divide
capital expenditures by lagged capital stock, we also lose the initial year a ﬁrm or ﬁrm segment enters the
database. We also lose observations that are non-contiguous.
We include a ﬁrm’s lagged size and the lagged number of plants in the segment as control variables.
We also include the industry capital intensity, calculated as the sum of all capital expenditures divided by
the sum of all industry shipments. We industry and year adjust all capital expenditure and productivity
data, subtracting out the industry-year averages.
3.2 Long-run Industry Conditions
We classify industries on the basis of exogenous shifts in their operating environments that may require
diﬀerent ﬁnancial and organizational capabilities of ﬁrms, and that may therefore enable us to identify the
advantages of diﬀerent organizational forms.
Given the diﬀerences in industry conditions previously shown in Figure 1, we capture the stages in
10We thank John Haltiwanger for providing us with these linkages.
11The segments we construct do not correspond to those reported by COMPUSTAT. However, segment data reported by
COMPUSTAT are subject to reporting biases. Firms have considerable ﬂexibility in how they report segments as shown by
Pacter (1993). Firms may also have strategic reasons for the speciﬁc segments they choose or choose not to report, as Hayes
and Lundholm (1996) shows. Hyland (1999) ﬁnds that only 72 percent of ﬁrms that report under the FASB standards that
they go from one segment to more than one segment actually increase their number of segments.
10an industry life cycle by classifying 3-digit SIC manufacturing industries into four categories using both
shipments growth and changes in the number of ﬁrms. The ﬁrst cut divides industries into those in which
the growth of the real value of shipments during our sample period, 1972-1997 exceeds the median growth
of all manufacturing industries and the into those in which the growth of shipments fell below the median.
Many industries in the latter category experience an actual decline in shipments. Our second cut divides
i n d u s t r i e si n t ot h o s ei nw h i c ht h eg r o w t ho ft h en u m b e ro fp r o d u c e r se x c e e d st h em e d i a ng r o w t hi nt h e
number of producers for a manufacturing industry and those industries in which the number of producers
is lower than the median, again for the 1972-1997 period.
We also classify industries using ten-year ﬂoating windows, thereby allowing an industry to switch
between life-cycle classiﬁcations over time (for example, from growth to declining). We use Census year
data for these industry classiﬁcations because an accurate count of the number of ﬁrms is available in these
years. Census years are every ﬁve years beginning with 1972. To classify an industry in a particular year
using ﬂoating windows, we use the census year following a particular year and calculate the change to that
census year from the census 10 years prior. Thus for 1993 we would calculate the change in the real value
of shipments from 1987 to 1997. We also examine subperiods, speciﬁcally the 1980s and 1990s and found
no material diﬀerences versus the 10 year analysis that we report.
Table 1 presents summary statistics by industry category. The table shows that the industries in our
four categories diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Over the period 1972-1997 real shipments increase by an average of
43% in Growth Industries and decrease by 42% in Declining industries. Real shipments in Consolidating
industries change little (a two percent increase). Shipments fall by 28% in Technological Change industries.
As expected, the number of producers increases (+83.6%) in Growth industries and decreases (-34.6%) in
Declining industries. Technological Change and Consolidating industries present a contrast. Despite a
large drop in real output, the number of producers in the former increases by 45%. In the latter, despite
a stationary output level, there is a drop of 10.2% in the number of producers.
We also present long-run statistics for the 5 industries surrounding the average change in each category
to give a more detailed description of which industries are in each category. Declining industries include iron
and steel foundries, rubber and plastics footwear. Technological Change industries include metalworking
machinery and equipment. Consolidation industries include paper mills and carpet and rugs. Growth
industries include plastics, drugs and communications equipment.
Insert Table 1 here
In a declining industry both the number of ﬁrms and real shipments are growing more slowly than in
11a median industry. In many such industries the number of producers is falling and ﬁrms face the task of
managing decline or optimally exiting. Cash ﬂow may be low or negative and ﬁrms belonging to a conglom-
erate may be able to use its greater resources to obtain a competitive advantage. By examining diﬀerences
in investment and acquisition activity of conglomerates and single-segment ﬁrms in these industries we can
tell whether conglomerates shift resources away from industries with declining shipments.
Real shipments are also declining or growing slowly in Technological Change industries. However, the
high rate of growth of new producers in those industries implies that there exist growth opportunities.
Thus, by comparing the diﬀerences in investment patterns of conglomerates and single-segment ﬁrms in
Declining and Technological Change industries we can examine whether conglomerate ﬁrms’ response to
decline in shipments depends on the existence of growth opportunities in an industry.
3.3 Variable Construction: Financial Dependence and Productivity
A. Financial Dependence
To obtain a measure of the extent to which stand-alone ﬁrms and conglomerate segments can ﬁnance
their investment internally we deﬁne a segment to be ﬁnancially dependent (independent) in particular year
if the sum of the capital expenditures reported by all its plants exceeds (is less than) the total cash ﬂow
reported by these same plants. Cash ﬂow is deﬁned as the gross margin adjusted for inventory changes.
A conglomerate segment or stand-alone ﬁrm that is ﬁnancially independent is able to fund its plant-level
capital expenditures directly from cash ﬂow, without obtaining resources from head-oﬃce, other divisions,
or from the ﬁnancial markets.
To control for endogeneity, we ﬁrst predict ﬁnancial dependence and use the predicted ﬁnancial de-
pendence in our regressions. Our dependent variable takes on the value one if a segment is classiﬁed as
ﬁnancially dependent, and zero otherwise. For each segment in each year, predicted ﬁnancial deﬁcit is
estimated using by regressing actual ﬁnancial dependence on industry and ﬁrm-level variables that capture
a segment’s anticipated need for additional ﬁnancing beyond that produced via that segment’s internal
cash ﬂow.
In the regressions, our independent variables are the change in industry real shipments, lagged industry
proﬁtability measured by industry value added divided by industry shipments, industry capital intensity,
lagged segment-level productivity (ﬁxed eﬀect from a production function) estimated using ﬁve years of
lagged data from the segment’s industry, and the log of ﬁrm size.
Table 2 shows that a segment’s cash ﬂows depend on industry characteristics, in particular shipment-
growth. To capture industry-level diﬀerences we include several control variables. To control for potential
12growth in the industry we use the change in industry shipments. To capture the amount of internal cash
available to a segment we use industry value added, the diﬀerence between gross sales of the industry
and the cost of materials, labor and energy used in production, divided by industry sales. To control for
industry speciﬁcu s eo fl a r g ea m o u n t so fﬁxed assets, we use industry capital intensity, the sum of industry
capital expenditures divided by industry sales. The industry value added and industry capital intensity
measures are computed annually. All segment- and industry-level variables are at the three-digit SIC code
level. We include lagged segment productivity and segment productivity squared in the speciﬁcation to
allow for the possibility that highly productive ﬁrms invest more than their cash ﬂows.
Our measure of predicted ﬁnancial dependence is thus the predicted probability a segment will have
investment greater than the segment’s internal cash ﬂow controlling for industry-level growth, internal cash
ﬂows and capital intensity, and ﬁrm-level productivity and size. The predicted ﬁnancial dependence is
then used to examine how the relation between investment and predicted ﬁnancial dependence is aﬀected
by its ownership status (conglomerate or stand-alone), size, productivity and industry type.12
B. Productivity of Industry Segments
We calculate productivity for all ﬁrm segments at the plant level and aggregate this data into segments
using weighted averages. Our primary measure of performance is total factor productivity (TFP). TFP
takes the actual amount of output a plant produces with a given amount of inputs and compares it to a
predicted amount of output. “Predicted output” is what the plant is expected to have produced, given the
amount of inputs it used. A plant that produces more than the predicted amount of output has a greater-
than-average productivity. This measure does not impose the restrictions of constant returns to scale and
constant elasticity of scale that a “dollar in, dollar out” cash ﬂow measure requires. For robustness and
comparability with prior studies, we also explore how segment growth is related to segment operating
margin, both of the segment in question and of the conglomerates other segments. However, this operating
margin diﬀers from a typical cash ﬂow number because our plant-level data does not measure indirect
segmental level costs, such as advertising and research and development
To calculate a plant’s predicted output, we assume that the plants in each industry have a translog
production function. This functional form is a second-degree approximation to any arbitrary production
function, and therefore takes into account interactions between inputs. In estimating the production
function we use the last ﬁve years of data for each plant - thus the ﬁrst year of our data for which we
have calculated productivity is 1979. For each industry we estimate this production function using an
12A division can be public and also be part of a conglomerate. Our speciﬁcations in the working paper version of this paper
(available on SSRN) allow for this possibility.
13unbalanced panel with plant-level ﬁxed eﬀects. To estimate productivity, we take the translog production
function and run a regression of log of the total value of shipments on the log of inputs, including cross-
product and squared terms:









where Qit represents output of plant i in year t, and Ljit is the quantity of input j used in production for
plant i for time period t. A is a technology shift parameter, assumed to be constant by industry, fi is a
plant-ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect (if a plant changes owners a new ﬁxed eﬀect is estimated. We leave oﬀ the
ﬁrm subscript for tractability), and cj =
PN
i=1 cji indexes returns-to-scale. We deﬂate for industry price at
the four digit level.
We obtain two measures of plant-level TFP from equation (1). First we have a ﬁrm-industry segment
ﬁxed eﬀect, fi, which we use in the regression to predict segment ﬁnancial dependence. The segment ﬁxed
eﬀect captures persistent productivity eﬀects, such as those arising from managerial quality (Griliches
(1957) and Mundlak (1961, 1978)). It also captures a segment’s ability to price higher than the industry
average. Second, we obtain a ﬁrm-plant residual that we aggregate up into segments using predicted
output to construct a segment weighted productivity that we use in our regressions examining acquisitions,
investment and plant birth.
In each case we standardize plant-level TFP by subtracting out industry average TFP in each year and
dividing by the standard deviation of TFP for each industry. We standardize to control for diﬀerences in
precision with which productivity is estimated within industries. This correction is analogous to a simple
measurement error correction and is similar to the procedure used to produce standardized cumulative
excess returns in event studies.13 In computing the segment-level productivity in our regressions we
construct a weighted average of the individual plant productivities, with weights equal to the predicted
output of each plant.
We also include other ﬁrm and segment-level variables in our regressions to provide additional control
for unmeasured productivity diﬀerences and other factors, such as size, that can inﬂuence ﬁrm investment.
We include the log of ﬁrm size and the number of plants operated in an industry segment at the beginning
of the year. We deﬁne ﬁrm size as the total deﬂated (using industry price deﬂators) value of shipments in
1982 dollars.
In estimating the TFPs in our sample, we use data for over 1,000,000 plant years, and for approximately
13This standardization does not aﬀect the results we report. The results have similar levels of signiﬁcance when we do not
standardize productivity in this manner.
1450,000 plants each year. In the productivity regression for each industry, we include three diﬀerent types of
inputs, capital, labor, and materials, as explanatory variables. All these data exist at the plant level. Our
productivity calculations do not capture any headquarters or divisional level costs that are not reported
at the plant-level (i.e. overhead, research and development). The ASM also does not state the actual
quantity shipped by each plant, but shows only the value of shipments. We thus deﬂa t et h ev a l u eo f
shipments by 1982 price deﬂators to get a real value of shipments. For all inputs and outputs measured in
dollars, we adjust for inﬂation by using four-digit SIC deﬂator data from the Bartelsman and Gray (1994)
database. Each input has to have a non-zero reported value. Kovenock and Phillips (1997) describe these
inputs and the method for accounting for inﬂation and depreciation of capital stock in more detail.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Summary Statistics
We ﬁrst present summary statistics by both industry classiﬁcation and also organization type. In par-
ticular we examine the relation between industry type and three variables of interest, cash ﬂows, capital
expenditures and plant acquisition.
–––––—
Insert Table 2 here
–––––—
Table 2 shows that the number of single-segment ﬁr m si sf a rg r e a t e rt h a nt h en u m b e ro fc o n g l o m e r a t e
ﬁrms. However, the number of segments operated by conglomerate ﬁrms and the percent of industry output
produced by conglomerate ﬁrms is greater - with the exception of Growth industries - than that produced
by single-segment ﬁrms. Interestingly, in Growth industries conglomerate ﬁrms operate 38 percent of the
industry segments but produce a far greater percentage, 63.2 percent, of industry output. Thus, segment
sizes of conglomerate ﬁrms relative to single segment ﬁrms are the largest in Growth industries.
The second panel of Table 2 shows that for segments as a whole the ratio of average annual cash
ﬂow to sales is positively related to the real rate of shipments growth. The ratio is highest in Growth
industries at 7.30% and lowest in Declining industries at 4.13%. The diﬀerence in these two ratios is
statistically signiﬁcant at the ﬁve percent level. Examining the cash ﬂow statistics by organizational
type, Table 2 shows that plants of conglomerate segments consistently realize substantially higher cash
ﬂows than those of stand-alone ﬁrms for all industry categories. Segment size and organizational type
15aﬀect the diﬀerences in cash ﬂows between segments of single- and multiple-segment ﬁrms. Large segments
consistently realize substantially higher cash ﬂows than small segments. The diﬀerence is approximately
ﬁve to seven percentage points, and is particularly striking in Declining industries, where small segments
are barely breaking even at the segment level.14 When we focus on large segments only, and vary the
organizational form, the table shows that conglomerate segments consistently realize cash ﬂows that are
1.5-3 percentage points higher than single-segment ﬁrms.
Next, we examine the ratio of average annual plant-level capital expenditures to lagged capital stock.
This ratio is highest in Growth industries and lowest in Declining industries. The single-segment ﬁrms’
capital expenditure to lagged capital stock ratio exceeds that of the mean segment of multi-segment ﬁrms
in all industry categories. However, overall, the capital expenditure rates are similar across organizational
forms.
The last block of numbers in Table 2 shows the percentage of total segment growth accounted for by
within-segment acquisitions. The results show that proportion of ﬁrm growth accounted by acquisition
is substantially higher for multiple-segment ﬁrms than for single-segment ﬁrms. In Declining industries,
within-industry growth by acquisition for multiple-segment ﬁrms it is 26.07 percent, whereas it is only 5.31
percent of ﬁrm growth for single-segment ﬁrms. In Growth industries the diﬀerence is even larger. In
Growth industries the within-industry growth via acquisition by multiple-segment ﬁr m si s3 6 . 0 8p e r c e n t ,
25 percentage points more than proportion of growth of single-segment ﬁrms accounted by acquisition.
Across industry categories, we see that within-industry growth via acquisition for multiple-segment ﬁrms
in Growth industries is also 10 percentage points higher than the corresponding number for multiple-
segment ﬁrms in Declining industries.15
These summary statistics show that diﬀerences in acquisition rates between multiple- and single-
segment ﬁrms are substantial. Capital expenditure rates are fairly stable across industries, segment
size and ﬁrm organization, while acquisition rates vary sharply across diﬀerent ﬁrm sizes and organiza-
tional forms. The literature on the relation between conglomerate cash ﬂow and investment has focussed
on whether conglomerates’ capital expenditures are eﬃcient or whether they are driven by ﬁnancial con-
straints and agency issues. Although the data sources are not directly comparable because most previous
studies use COMPUSTAT data, these initial results show that capital expenditures are not very diﬀerent
14This suggests that models that predict early exit of larger producers in declining industries may be missing an important
empirical diﬀerence between small and large segments.
15When we calculate the importance of acquisition using the numbers of plants purchased, we also ﬁnd that conglomerate
ﬁrms’ acquisition rate in terms of number of plants purchased divided by the number of existhing plants is also two to three
times greater than that of single-segment ﬁrms. In particular, the rate of acquisition by conglomerate ﬁrms in Consolidation
a n dG r o w t hi n d u s t r i e si s3 . 1 and 2.6 times, respectively, the rate of single-segment ﬁrms.
16for single- and multiple-segment ﬁrms, and are in fact a higher percentage for single-segment ﬁrms. How-
ever, these summary statistics show that plant acquisition are sensitive to industry conditions, segment
size and signiﬁcantly greater for multiple-segment ﬁrms. The ﬁndings that eﬀects of organizational form
are greater for acquisitions than capital expenditures at existing plants are consistent with Hypothesis 3.
We next investigate segments’ capital expenditures and plant acquisitions in a multivariate framework
and examine how ﬁnancial dependence of industry segments impacts acquisition and investment.
4.2 Financial Dependence and Firm Organizational Status
We begin our analysis of ﬁnancial dependence in Table 3. Our goal is to analyze how ﬁnancial dependence
and industry factors aﬀect a ﬁrm’s investment and acquisition decisions. However, given that a ﬁrm
segment’s ﬁnancial deﬁcit may be endogenous, we ﬁrst run a ﬁrst-stage regression where we predict the
ﬁnancial dependence of a ﬁrm’s segment at the three-digit SIC code. We use predicted dependence in our
later regressions that examine investment and acquisitions.
I nT a b l e3 ,w ee s t i m a t eas e g m e n ti sp r e d i c t e dt ob eﬁnancially dependent using a panel logistic
speciﬁcation. A segment is classiﬁed as ﬁnancially dependent, with ﬁnancial dependence equal to 1,
when its capital expenditures exceeds the segment’s cash ﬂow, and zero otherwise. We regress ﬁnancial
dependence on lagged ﬁrm and industry-level variables that capture its need for external (to the segment)
ﬁnancial capital.
Insert Table 3 here
Column 1 of Table 3 shows that a segment in a fast growing industry is less likely to be ﬁnancially
dependent than a segment in a slow growing industry. The table’s results show that segments in capital
intensive industries are more likely to be ﬁnancially dependent. The relation between the probability of
ﬁnancial deﬁcit and a segment’s productivity is convex as there is a negative coeﬃcient on productivity
and a positive coeﬃcient on productivity squared. Very high productivity thus increases the likelihood of
ﬁnancial dependence. This convexity causes a ﬁrm to be ﬁnancially dependent at the 87th percentile of
productivity, holding other characteristics at their median values. Lastly, large ﬁrms are less likely to be
ﬁnancially dependent.
In Table 2, Columns 2 and 3, we estimate this speciﬁcation on two sub-samples: segments in industries
w i t ha b o v em e d i a na n db e l o wm e d i a nc h a n g ei nr e a ls h i p m e n t so v e ro u rl o n g - r u n2 5y e a rp e r i o d . T h e
sub-sample results are similar to those for the whole sample with several exceptions. The coeﬃcient
of the change in industry shipments changes from negative to positive (albeit insigniﬁcant) in growth
17industries. Second, the coeﬃcient on lagged industry proﬁtability is approximately one-third smaller
in high-growth industries than in low-growth industries. Thus, while high-growth industries are more
proﬁtable, they demand even more capital to meet industry growth as proﬁtability has a smaller impact on
ﬁnancial dependence in these industries. Third, the squared productivity term remains positive and highly
signiﬁcant in high-growth industries but is basically zero for slow-growth industries. Thus, in slow-growth
industries there is no partial oﬀsetting eﬀect that makes highly productive segments more likely to be
ﬁnancially dependent. In these industries, productive segments are less likely to ﬁnancially dependent than
in high growth industries. These results are consistent with highly productive ﬁrm segments demanding
more capital to invest in high-growth industries, thus increasing their likelihood of ﬁnancial dependence.
To control for endogeneity of organizational status we conduct a similar analysis to examine the pre-
dicted decision to become a conglomerate. We use the predicted ﬁrm status in our subsequent regressions.16
In Table 4 we examine whether individual segments are more likely to be part of conglomerate ﬁrms. We
undertake this analysis for two reasons. First, we recognize that ﬁrm status is endogenous and thus wish to
use predicted ﬁrm status in subsequent regressions that examine investment and acquisitions. Second, the
inﬂuence of industry factors on whether segments belong to conglomerate ﬁr m si so fi n d e p e n d e n ti n t e r e s t .
We estimate a logistic regression where the dependent variable is equal to one if the segment is part of
a conglomerate ﬁrm in Column 1 o fT a b l e4 . B e c a u s ew ea r ee x p l o r i n gt h er o l eo fﬁnancial dependence
on the decision to be a conglomerate segment, our speciﬁcation is similar to the one predicting ﬁnancial
dependence in Table 3. However, since our hypotheses predict that conglomerate segments have advantages
in some industry categories we include long-run changes in industry shipments as a predictor. Since we do
not split the sample by long-run changes in industry shipments, the inclusion of this variable is permitted.
Insert Table 4 here
The results show that in industries with high long-run growth industry shipments, segments are more
likely to be part of a conglomerate ﬁrm. Short-run (annual) changes do not increase the probability that a
segment belongs to a conglomerate ﬁrm. Industry capital intensity is a particularly important predictor of
whether a segment belongs to a conglomerate ﬁrm, with a relative-odds ratio of 176. Thus, a ten-percent
increase in industry capital intensity increases the likelihood of a segment belonging to a conglomerate by
17.6 times. Productivity also has a signiﬁcant impact on the status of a ﬁrm segment. Segments with
16In a previous draft, available from the authors, we used actual ﬁrm status in the regressions. The coeﬃcients of
the actual ﬁrm status indicator variables (not instrumented) were more signiﬁcant for acquisitions and signiﬁcant for plant
exit. The signiﬁcance of key interaction variables was similar in all cases. Thus, we view the results reported here as more
conservative.
18low productivity and segments that are very highly productive are relatively more likely to be part of a
conglomerate ﬁrm, yielding a U-shaped relation between productivity and conglomerate status.
4.3 Plant Acquisitions
A. Financial Dependence and Acquisitions
This section analyzes the eﬀect of predicted ﬁnancial dependence and ﬁrm organization on within-
industry plant acquisitions. Table 5 examines the eﬀect of our diﬀerent long-run industry categories using
both 10 and 25 year windows. The 25 year window captures long run trends in the industry. The 10y e a r
window allows an industry to switch categories over time. For any given year, the industry category for
the 10 year window is calculated using the change in real value of industry shipments from surrounding
census years.17
We estimate predicted ﬁnancial dependence of segments using the speciﬁcation presented in Table 3.
We estimate the predicted probability of conglomerate status using the speciﬁcation of Table 4. As a
measure of segment productivity we construct a weighted average of each plants productivity with weights
equal to plant predicted shipments. We include the lagged number of ﬁrm plants in each segment as a
control variable.18
–––––—
Insert Table 5 here
–––––—
In order to examine whether the eﬀects are statistically diﬀerent from each other for diﬀerent industry
categories, we form a triple-interaction variables. To form this variable we interact the predicted probability
that a segment is part of a conglomerate with its predicted dependence and with the quadrant indicator
variables.19
Table 5 reveals several patterns. First, for all industry categories, except for Declining industries in
the 10-year window, single-segment ﬁrms that are predicted to be ﬁnancially dependent have a lower
17We also estimate this speciﬁcation using continuous measures of the changes in industry conditions - instead of the 4
separate quadrant indicators used here. We include the change in the number of ﬁrms and the change in industry shipments
in separate speciﬁcations, over both 10- and 25-year periods to examine the eﬀect of each of these long-run changes separately.
The results are very similar and are avaible in a previous version of the paper.
18We also checked whether the results are robust to including ﬁrm size as a substitute for the number of ﬁrm plants. The
results were similar and conclusions unaﬀected by this change.
19We also constructed a similar interaction variable for public ﬁrm status. The version of this paper available on SSRN
shows that public ﬁrm status also oﬀsets part of the negative eﬀect of predicted dependence in Growth industries. The
variable public interacted with predicted dependence is positive and signiﬁcant in Growth industries for the 25 year period.
However, this eﬀect was much smaller than that for conglomerate ﬁrms thus we focus the paper on organizational form.
19probability of acquiring plants in their industry from other ﬁrms. Second, in all categories, except for
Declining industries, this negative eﬀect of ﬁnancial dependence on acquisitions is oﬀset for conglomerate
ﬁrms. This oﬀsetting eﬀect is shown by the positive coeﬃcient on the interaction of predicted ﬁnancial
dependence with conglomerate ﬁrm status and the quadrant indicator variable. The interaction eﬀect is
greatest in growing industries (Growth and Consolidating). The coeﬃcient of the interaction variable for
Growth industries is statistically greater than for the other industry categories for the 10-year window,
and all industry categories except Consolidating industries for the 25-year window (chi-squared tests not
reported). Thus these results support the prediction in Hypothesis 1 that the eﬀects of organizational form
on mitigating the eﬀects of ﬁnancial dependence is greatest in growing industries.
Lastly, given Lamont and Polk’s (2002) ﬁnding that the diversity of conglomerate’s operations across
industries aﬀects its value, we include a variable capturing a ﬁrm’s diversity of opportunities. We include
the standard deviation of industry growth across a conglomerate ﬁrm’s segments. The regressions show
that this variable is unrelated to the probability of a ﬁrm making acquisitions.20
Tables 6A further investigates the eﬀects of organizational form in Growth industries. We examine
Growth industries in detail because our previous results indicate that organizational form has a particularly
large eﬀect in these industries. Column 1 of this table examine the eﬀect of conglomerate ﬁrms’ status by
itself when the interaction term between conglomerate status and predicted dependence is not included.
In the third column we include a variable that measures the relative productivity of the ﬁrm’s division
in the growth industry relative to that of main divisions, if any, that the ﬁrm has in declining industries.
This variable is calculated as the simple diﬀerence in productivity between these divisions. If a ﬁrm has
no division in a declining industry. We use this variable to examine whether productive conglomerate
segments if growth industries grow faster if the conglomerate has a less productive division in a declining
industry, as predicted by Hypothesis 2. Finally, Columns 4 and 5 split the segments into high and low
productivity subsamples. This enables us to see high and low productivity segments of conglomerates in
growth industries have diﬀerent investment patterns.
–––––—
Insert Table 6A here
–––––—
Column one of Table 6A shows that conglomerate ﬁrm status positively is positively related to the
20Using the input-output matrix we also examined whether these results varied by whehter or not the conglomerate’s
divisions were in related versus unrelated industries. We found that the results for ﬁnancial dependence were not aﬀected
much by whether the conglomerate segments are unrelated or related.
20rate of acquisitions. As shown in the second column, the coeﬃcient on the interaction variable between
predicted conglomerate status and the predicted ﬁnancing deﬁcit is also positive and signiﬁcant. Columns
three and ﬁve in Table 6A show that conglomerate segments in Growth industries have a signiﬁcantly higher
probability of acquiring plants if the conglomerate also has a less productive main division in a declining
industry. These results show that multi-segment ﬁrms acquiring additional plants in their productive
segments in growth industries and relaxing ﬁnancial dependence for these segments. As predicted by
Hypothesis 2, this eﬀect is greater when conglomerate ﬁrms also have a division in a declining industry.
B. Economic Signiﬁcance of Our Results
To investigate the economic signiﬁcance of these eﬀects, we compute the probability that a segment
b e l o n g i n gt od i ﬀerent subsamples of single-segment and multi-segment ﬁrms acquires a plant. For each
subsample we use the median value of each variable and then vary the predicted probability that a segment
is ﬁnancially dependent from the 10th to the 90th percentile. We compute the probability that a segment
makes an acquisition for diﬀerent levels of the predicted probability of ﬁnancial dependence.
–––––—
Insert Table 6B here
–––––—
Table 6B reports the economic signiﬁcance of our results. We report the probability of within-industry
acquisitions for conglomerate and single-segment ﬁrms using the speciﬁcation in Table 5A, column 2. We
also report economic eﬀects for the Declining industry quadrant using a similar speciﬁcation for compa-
rability. The table shows that multi-segment ﬁrms have substantially higher probabilities of making an
acquisition than single-segment ﬁrms. Thus, for example, in Growth industries a conglomerate segment
with the median levels of all variables for conglomerate segments has a 6.26% probability of making an ac-
quisition in an any year, whereas the single-segment ﬁrm has a 0.57% probability of making an acquisition
at the median levels of the variables for single-segment ﬁrms. As the probability of being ﬁnancially con-
strained increases from the 10th percentile to the 90th percentile the probability of acquisitions increases
for multi-segment ﬁrms but decreases for single-segment ﬁrms. Thus ﬁnancially dependent single-segment
ﬁrms are less likely to acquire plants, whereas ﬁnancially dependent conglomerate segments are more likely
to acquire plants. Given that ﬁnancial dependence occurs when a segment’s investment is high relative to
its cash ﬂow, this suggests that segments of conglomerate ﬁrms acquire plants when capital expenditures
exceed segment cash ﬂow, while single-segment ﬁrms have diﬃculty in making acquisitions when capital
expenditures exceed cash ﬂow.
21To investigate the causes of these diﬀerences in acquisition probabilities between single-segment ﬁrms
and conglomerate segments we recompute the probability of acquisition for single-segment ﬁrms using the
median values of the data from conglomerate segments and the coeﬃcient estimates for single-ﬁrms. We
obtain these probabilities by setting the conglomerate dummy and segment rank to zero. The computed
probabilities are estimates of the probability that single-segment ﬁrms would have acquired plants if they
had the median data values of the conglomerate ﬁrms in our sample. The estimates show that there a sub-
stantial proportion of the diﬀerence in estimated probabilities is explained by diﬀerences in characteristics of
single-segment and conglomerate ﬁrms. Thus, in Growth Industries, the median single-segment ﬁrm would
have had 4.22% probability of making an acquisition if it had the data from the median multi-segment ﬁrm
(as opposed to the actual median single-segment ﬁrm, which has a 0.39% probability of acquisition). The
diﬀerence between the median conglomerate segment’s estimated 6.26% estimated probability of making
an acquisition and the 4.55% probability the single-segment would have had if it had the median values
of the data for a conglomerate ﬁr mc a nb ea t t r i b u t e dt od i ﬀerences in organizational form. The results
show that organizational form makes a larger diﬀerence for segments predicted to be ﬁnancially dependent
than for segments not predicted to be ﬁnancially dependent. Comparing across the ﬁrst and last rows for
Declining and Growth industries (comparing conglomerate segments to single-segments with the data from
conglomerate segments), it is striking that organizational form makes a larger diﬀerence (almost twice as
large) in Growth industries than in Declining industries.
In the third and fourth panels, we also spilt the data into high and low productivity segments and
compute the predicted probability of an acquisition using the speciﬁcations in columns 5 and 6 of Table 6A.
The results show that the previous eﬀects of organizational form are higher for more productive segments
of conglomerate ﬁrms. As shown in the third panel, the probability of a within-industry acquisition for
multi-segment ﬁrms increases to 7.97% when predicted ﬁnancial dependence is at the 90th percentile. This
evidence is consistent with conglomerate ﬁrms helping acquire plants in productive business segments.
These results shows that within-industry acquisition probabilities depend on ﬁrm organizational form
in several diﬀerent ways. First, conglomerate ﬁrms do acquire more within their industries than single
segment ﬁrms overall. Second, particularly in Growth industries, acquisition probabilities increase with
predicted ﬁnancial dependence for conglomerate ﬁrms’ productivity segments, while they decrease with ﬁ-
nancial dependence for single-segment ﬁrms. This ﬁnding is consistent with conglomerate ﬁrms providing
resources to segments with growth opportunities. Third, the acquisition probability of a conglomerate
ﬁrm’s most productive segments in growth industries increases when it has a division in a declining in-
dustry - a result that is consistent with the theoretical prediction in Stein (1997) and Maksimovic and
22Phillips (2002) and also with Boston Consulting Group’s prescription for non-growth industries to help
fund “shining stars.” The results are not consistent with theories which predict that conglomerate ﬁrms
subsidize their less-eﬃcient divisions because of inﬂuence costs.
C. Post-Acquisition Changes in Productivity
To examine whether these acquisitions are associated with value creation, Table 7 presents the ex post
changes in productivity for the acquired plants. We compute the changes in productivity over a four-year
window. These changes in productivity are industry and year adjusted.
Insert Table 7 here
Table 7 shows that productivity changes for conglomerate acquisitions are signiﬁcantly greater than zero
in Technological Change and, in particular, in Growth industries. In all windows, -1 to +1, +2, +3 and +4
we ﬁnd that industry-adjusted productivity signiﬁcantly increases. In contrast, plants purchased by single-
segment ﬁrms in these industries either show no signiﬁcant increase or a slight decrease in productivity.
In sum, growth by acquisition is greater for segments of ﬁrms that are organized as conglomerates.
Predicted ﬁnancial dependence reduces the probability that a single-segment ﬁrm grows by acquisition, but
has a considerably smaller, if any, eﬀect on conglomerate segments. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, plants
acquired by conglomerate ﬁrms in Technological Change and Growth industries experience signiﬁcant
increases in productivity post-acquisition. These results are not consistent with agency theories that
predict that conglomerates overexpand into industries without good growth prospects and in which they
have little expertise.
Overall, the analysis suggests that acquisition activity of conglomerates is consistent with Stein’s (1997)
model of the beneﬁts of internal capital markets and the predictions about the eﬃcient reallocation of assets
within conglomerate ﬁrms in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). These results are not consistent with models
that predict subsidization of poorly performing divisions or divisions with poor growth prospects. The
results are also not consistent with agency or empire building models that predict expansion into industries
without considering the ex post prospects and productivity in these industries.
4.4 Capital Expenditures
We next examine the impact of predicted ﬁnancial dependence and organizational form on capital expen-
ditures. To test the eﬀect of ﬁnancial dependence and organizational form on capital expenditures, we
interact predicted conglomerate ﬁrm status with predicted ﬁnancial dependence. In Table 8, we esti-
mate our capital expenditures regression for the four diﬀerent industry categories separately. Alternative
23speciﬁcations using industry interaction variables, as in Table 5A, give similar results.
Insert Table 8 here
Table 8 shows that the eﬀects of ﬁnancial dependence and conglomerate structure depend on industry
categories. Predicted ﬁnancial dependence negatively aﬀects capital expenditures in all categories. How-
ever, the negative eﬀect of ﬁnancial dependence is greatest for single-segment ﬁrms than for conglomerate
segments, as the interaction term, conglomerate status times predicted dependence, is positive and signif-
icant for all categories. We do ﬁnd that this interaction term is signiﬁcantly higher for Consolidation and
Growth industries versus Declining and Technological Change categories.
Finally, the weighted average plant-level productivity of a segment is signiﬁcantly related to investment
in all industry categories. This ﬁnding contrasts with the case of acquisitions where the eﬀect was only
present in growth industries. The relation between a segment’s productivity and its capital expenditures is
more robust than the relation between its productivity and the probability of within-industry acquisitions.
As a robustness test, we also checked whether the same results hold when we consider only major
investments by ﬁrms. Whited (2002) shows that peripheral divisions of conglomerates make large invest-
ments more frequently that similarly sized single-segment ﬁrms. We rerun the regressions taking as our
dependent variable an indicator variables that takes the value 1 if the ratio of capital expenditures over
lagged capital stock employed by the segment exceeds the 90th percentile of this variable, industry ad-
justed. These regressions are more likely to pick up major investments by smaller segments because large
segments with many plants are more likely to be able to smooth their investment ﬂows across time.
These unreported regressions show that our results are robust across all industry categories. In each
case, single-segment ﬁrms not predicted to be ﬁnancially dependent are most likely to invest the most, and
single segment ﬁrms predicted to be ﬁnancially dependent invest the least. The investment of conglomerate
segments falls between these two levels, with those conglomerate segments predicted to be ﬁnancially
dependent investing less than ﬁnancially independent segments. We also ﬁnd that in every industry
category the more productive ﬁrms have a higher probability of a major investment than the less productive
ﬁrms.
Comparing these results for capital expenditures with the results for acquisitions (Table 5 and 6A), we
ﬁnd evidence consistent with Hypothesis 3, that the eﬀect of conglomerate organization on acquisitions
is stronger than it is on capital expenditures. This evidence is of interest since the study of capital
expenditures has received the most attention by previous research.
244.5 New Plant Openings and Plant Exit
We next examine the eﬀect of predicted ﬁnancial dependence and ﬁrm organization on new plant openings
and plant exit over across our industry categories. For new plant openings, we aggregate a ﬁrm’s plants
up into three-digit industries to examine whether a particular ﬁrm-segment acquires an additional plant.
Insert Table 9 here
Table 9 shows that in Growth and Consolidating industries predicted ﬁnancial dependence has a sig-
niﬁcant negative eﬀect on plant openings of for single-segment ﬁrms. Conglomerate ﬁrms mitigate the
eﬀects of predicted ﬁnancial dependence on new plant openings for their segments in Growth industries.
Table 9 shows that the key conglomerate interaction variable only aﬀects plant births in Growth industries
and Consolidation industries.21 As expected, we also ﬁnd that segments with a higher number of plants
are more likely to open plants in all industry categories.
Insert Table 10 here
Table 10 examines plant exit over the diﬀerent industry categories. We run these regressions at
the plant level and assign the dependent variable equal to one if the plant exits in a given year and zero
otherwise. Table 10s h o w st h a tt h ee ﬀect of predicted ﬁnancial dependence on plant exit is insigniﬁcant
in all categories except for Growth industries. The eﬀect of conglomerate ﬁrm status is limited. Plants
of conglomerate ﬁrms that belong to segments predicted to be ﬁnancially dependent are less likely to
close in Declining industries as shown by the interaction variable conglomerate*predicted dependence.
In other industry categories this eﬀect is insigniﬁcant. More eﬃcient plants are also less likely to be
closed down. Segment size aﬀects closure in two ways. As the number of plants in a segment increases,
closure probabilities increase. However bigger segments are less likely to be closed down, as shown by the
coeﬃcient on segment rank.22
Overall, the results for new plant openings and plant exit diﬀer over our long-run industry categories.
New plant openings and plant exit depend on ﬁrm organizational form in several diﬀerent ways. First, in
growth industries, conglomerate ﬁrms that are predicted to be ﬁnancially dependent have a signiﬁcantly
higher probability of new plant openings compared to dependent single-segment ﬁrms. Second, the proba-
b i l i t yo fn e wp l a n to p e n i n g sb yp r i v a t e ,s i n g l e - s e g m e n tﬁrms are the most adversely aﬀected by predicted
21Results in the working paper show that this eﬀect was robust to including public ﬁrm status variable.
22Unpreported regressions show that public ﬁrms are more likely to close plants, signiﬁcantly so in Consolidation and
Growth industries. However the interaction eﬀect of predicted public status with ﬁnancial dependence was insigniﬁcant for
all industry categories.
25ﬁnancial dependence. Third, there is a more limited eﬀect of conglomerate organizational form and ﬁnan-
cial dependence on plant exit. In declining industries, conglomerate ﬁrms are less likely to close plants
of segments predicted to be ﬁnancially dependent. However, this eﬀect is insigniﬁcant in other industry
categories. These results suggest that organizational form aﬀects exit and plant openings diﬀerently, most
likely because plant openings require signiﬁcant resources, including the ability to integrate the new plant
into existing operations, while plant exit does not. The results are consistent with Hypotheses 2 and 4
that conglomerate ﬁrms have skills in integrating new acquisitions and providing resources that aﬀect large
decisions like acquisitions and plant openings in productive industry segments.
5 Conclusions
A growing corporate ﬁnance literature examines how multi-industry ﬁrms allocate investment across divi-
sions. This literature tacitly assumes industries do not diﬀer much and that the relevant diﬀerences can be
summarized by simple measures of investment opportunities. We argue that the competitive environment
of an industry depends on changes in long-run industry conditions. Industries in diﬀerent stages of their
life cycle diﬀer in the opportunities for proﬁtable restructuring and in exploitable growth opportunities.
These diﬀerences in the competitive environment have the potential to alter the comparative advantage of
conglomerate multi-industry ﬁrms relative to single-industry ﬁrms. A comparative analysis of investment
by segments of conglomerates and single-industry ﬁrms has to take these diﬀerences into account. To this
end, we classify U.S. manufacturing industries into four diﬀerent long-run industry categories based on the
growth rates of real shipments and changes in the number of producers.
We ﬁnd evidence that the eﬀects of ﬁrm organization vary across these long-run industry changes. We
have four major results that show the importance of long-run industry conditions.
First, in industries where shipments are growing, within-industry acquisitions and new plant open-
ings are signiﬁcantly aﬀected by ﬁrm organizational form. Conglomerates’ segments are much more
likely to purchase a plant adding to their existing segments than are single-industry ﬁrms. By
contrast, capital expenditure rates are fairly stable across industries, segment size and ﬁrm organi-
zation.
Second, examining acquired plants post-acquisition, we ﬁnd that plants acquired by conglomer-
ate ﬁrms in Technological Change and, in particular, in Growth industries signiﬁcantly increase in
productivity post-acquisition.
26Third, we ﬁnd evidence that within-industry acquisition rates are higher for conglomerates in growth
industries when their divisions have high relative productivity versus their divisions in declining
industries. Since the conglomerate eﬀect on acquisitions is stronger for segments of high productivity
there does not appear to be subsidization of a conglomerate’s less eﬃcient segments.
Fourth, for new plant openings, we ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant positive eﬀect of belonging to
a conglomerate in growth industries. Conglomerate ﬁrms oﬀset the eﬀects of predicted ﬁnancial
dependence on new plant openings in growth industries. The eﬀects on plant exit are more limited.
These ﬁndings are consistent with the existence of beneﬁts of internal capital markets as argued by
Stein (1997) and examined empirically by Khanna and Tice (2001)a n dP e y e r( 2 0 0 1). The ﬁnding that the
probability of an acquisition in growth industries increases for conglomerate ﬁrms which have high produc-
tivity segments in growing industries and substantial other segments in declining industries are consistent
with the theoretical prediction in Maksimovic and Phillips (2002). These results are not consistent with
models that predict subsidization of poorly performing divisions or divisions with poor growth prospects.
The results are also not consistent with agency or empire building models that predict ineﬃcient expansion
into industries.
These ﬁndings have important implications for the literature on conglomerates’ allocation of invest-
ment. This literature uses capital expenditures to proxy for investment by a segment. Thus, it leaves
out plant acquisition, which is an important component of conglomerate ﬁrms’ investment but is not an
important component of single-industry ﬁrms’ investment. We document large eﬀects of organizational
form on ﬁnancial dependence on acquisitions and plant openings. The diﬀerences in these eﬀects of ﬁrm
organization are largest in growing industries. These eﬀect of organizational form on ﬁnancial dependence
on acquisitions has not been previously identiﬁed and is even stronger than the usually studied relation
between conglomerate status and capital expenditures.
Overall, these ﬁndings document important eﬀects of ﬁrm organization that vary over long-run changes
in industry conditions. The ﬁndings are consistent with conglomerate in growth industries providing
resources that help business segments reduce or break the link between a segment’s predicted ﬁnancial
dependence and its growth via acquisition and new plant opening decisions.
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29Table 1
Long-Run Industry Conditions
Industry Classification /  Long-run (25 year) Change in:
        SIC code Industry Shipments Number of Firms
All Declining Industries - Average Change -41.95% -34.64%
 Industries surrounding the average change in shipments
332 Iron and Steel Foundaries -52.56% -25.79%
302 Rubber And Plastics Footwear -47.35% -37.25%
311 Leather Tanning And Finishing -47.15% -47.88%
271 Newspapers: Publishing and Printing -41.88% -40.48%
341 Metal Cans And Shipping Containers -37.22% 1.42%
All Technological Change Industries - Average Change -28.41% 44.96%
 Industries surrounding the average change in shipments
281 Industrial Inorganic Chemicals -30.53% 54.09%
329 Abrasive, Asbestos, And Miscellaneous -28.59% 41.46%
354 Metalworking Machinery And Equipment -25.92% 44.60%
342 Cutlery, Handtools, And General Hardware -22.55% 28.93%
356 General Industrial Machinery And Equipment -17.73% 54.00%
All Consolidation Industries  - Average Change 1.75% -10.22%
 Industries surrounding the average change in shipments
228 Yarn And Thread Mills -2.20% -28.23%
203 Canned, Frozen, And Preserved Fruits, Vegetables -0.87% -8.45%
201 Meat Products 4.90% -26.62%
262 Paper Mills 6.88% -23.46%
227 Carpets And Rugs 15.97% -15.72%
All Growth Industries - Average Change 42.99% 83.55%
 Industries surrounding the average change in shipments
282 Plastics Materials And Synthetic Resins 17.24% 61.43%
381 Search, Detection, Navigation, Guidance 36.39% 198.89%
283 Drugs 61.89% 123.85%
308 Plastic Products 129.45% 161.42%
366 Communications Equipment 202.02% 90.84%
All average changes are significantly different across industry categories.
Table presents summary statistics by long-run industry changes and organization over 25 years.  Declining 
(technological change, consolidation, growth) industries are industries that have long-run change in the real value 
(PPI deflated) of industry shipments over 1972-1987 in the lowest (lowest, highest, highest) fiftieth percentile and 
the long-run change in the number of firms in the lowest (highest, lowest, highest) fiftieth percentile.Table 2
Investment, Acquisitions and Industry Conditions
Industry classifications
Technological
Declining Change Consolidation Growth
Summary Statistics by Organizational Form 
Number of firms:    Single-segment firms 3,731 3,378 2,855 11,322
Multiple-segment firms 675 867 577 1,463
Average number of segments for multiple segment firm 6.53 6.17 5.62 4.81
Percent of total segments of multiple-segment firms 54.16% 61.29% 53.18% 38.33%
Percent of industry output produced by  64.70% 69.18% 67.18% 63.18%
multiple-segment firms
Average annual plant-level cash flow / sales
Plants of:  All firms 4.13% 4.96% 6.72% 7.30%
d
  Single-segment firms 3.65% 3.11% 5.54% 5.61%
d
  Multiple-segment firms 5.35% 7.87% 9.76% 10.43%
d
  Small firms 0.53% 1.76% 2.60% 3.71%
d
  Large firms 7.69% 8.13% 10.82% 10.87%
d
  Large single-segment firms 7.48% 6.59% 9.90% 9.26%
d
  Large multi-segment firms 8.02% 9.49% 12.17% 12.56%
d
Average annual plant-level capital expenditures / lagged capital stock 
Plants of:  All firms 16.93% 17.31% 17.59% 19.39%
d
  Single-segment firms 17.24% 18.10% 18.02% 20.09%
d
  Multiple-segment firms 16.17% 16.10% 16.49% 18.14%
d
  Small firms 16.14% 17.33% 16.45% 18.88%
d
  Large firms 17.29% 17.30% 18.03% 19.63%
d
Percent of total shipments growth accounted
     for by acquisitions
  Single-segment firms 5.31% 7.42% 8.85% 9.05%
e
  Multiple-segment firms 26.07% 30.17% 30.71% 36.08%
d
  Small firms 15.95% 21.25% 20.30% 24.61%
d
  Large firms 20.08% 24.56% 24.43% 28.52%
d
d,e Difference between Declining and Growth industries is significantly different from zero at the one-, five-percent level.
Table presents investment and acquisition statistics by long-run industry changes and organization over 25 years.  Declining 
(technological change, consolidation, growth) industries are industries that have long-run change in the real value (PPI deflated) 
of industry shipments over 1972-1987 in the lowest (lowest, highest, highest) fiftieth percentile and the long-run change in the 
number of firms in the lowest (highest, lowest, highest) fiftieth percentile.Table 3:   Financial Dependence                                 
Dependent Variable:  Dependence = 1 if Divisional Investment > Divisional Cash Flow
Change in Long-Run Shipments
All Industries Decline (-) Growth (+)
Variables:
Annual (Short-run) Change in Industry Shipments -0.202
a -0.221
a 0.112
                  standard error (.054) (.076) (.081)
                  relative odds ratio 0.798 0.802 1.119




                  standard error (.158) (.238) (.213)
                  relative odds ratio 5.896 0.363 0.633




                  standard error (.350) (.395) (.412)
                  relative odds ratio 5.896 274.239 2.268




                  standard error (.005) (.007) (.006)
                  relative odds ratio 0.459 0.462 0.454
(Firm-Industry Productivity)
2  (lagged) 0.044
a 0.005 0.071
a
                  standard error (.003) (.005) (.003)
                  relative odds ratio 1.044 1.005 1.074




                  standard error (.013) (.022) (.017)






                  standard error (.001) (.001) (.001)
                  relative odds ratio 0.562 1.001 1.001
Number of Observations 409,815 159,382 250,433
Psuedo R-squared 0.14 0.133 0.13
a,b,c Significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, ten-percent level.
Panel logit regressions examining the probability a division of a firm will invest more than its divisional cash 
flow.  Annual change in industry shipments is the change in industry shipments at the three-digit SIC code level 
deflated by industry price deflators to give the real change in industry shipments.   Industry capital intensity is 
capital expenditures and lagged industry profitability are both divided by industry sales at the three-digit SIC 
code level.  Firm-industry productivity is a firm-industry fixed effect from a production equation estimated 
using five years of lagged data.   Relative odds ratios are the change in the relative likelihood of financial 
dependence from a one unit increase in the variable.  All regressions contain industry and year fixed effects.   





Long-run (25 year) change in industry shipments 0.243
a
                  standard error (.019)
                  relative odds ratio 1.275
Annual change in Industry Shipments -0.619
a
                  standard error (.085)
                  relative odds ratio 0.538
Industry Capital Intensity 5.175
a
                  standard error (.546)
                  relative odds ratio 176.788
Firm-Industry Productivity:  Fixed Effect (lagged) -0.119
a
                  standard error (.018)
                  relative odds ratio 0.888
(Firm-Industry Productivity)
2  (lagged) 0.158
a
                  standard error (.019)
                  relative odds ratio 1.171
log(firm size) (lagged) 3.024
a
                  standard error (.042)




                  standard error (.002)
                  relative odds ratio 0.928
Number of Observations 409,815
Psuedo R-squared 0.57
a,b,c Significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, ten-percent level.
Panel logit regressions examining the probability a segment of a firm will be part of a conglomerate 
firm.  Long-run change in industry shipments is the change in industry shipments at the three-digit 
level over 1972-1997 divided by industry price deflators to give the real change.  Annual change in 
industry shipments is the annual change in industry shipments.    Industry capital intensity is capital 
expenditures divided by industry sales at the three-digit SIC code level, calculated in each year.  Firm-
industry productivity is a firm-industry fixed effect from a production equation estimated using five 
years of lagged data.   Relative odds ratios are the change in the relative likelihood of financial 
dependence from a one unit increase in the variable.  All regressions contain industry and year fixed 
effects.   (Robust standard errors that correct for autocorrelation within segments in parentheses).Table 5:   Plant Acquisition                
Length of time used to determine life-cycle quadrants
Dependent Variable:  Plant Acquisition 10 Year Window 25 Year Window
Variables: coefficient standard coefficient standard
error error
Predicted financial dependence
                        * Quadrant 1 Indicator:  Declining  0.334 (.244) 0.179 (.162)
                        * Quadrant 2 Indicator:  Tech. Change -0.278
b (.131) -0.250
a (.113)
                        * Quadrant 3 Indicator:  Consolidating -0.355
b (.156) -0.214 (.198)
                        * Quadrant 4 Indicator:  Growth 1.066
b (.485) -1.037
b (.456)
Conglomerate multi-industry indicator (predicted) 3.135
a (.070) 3.110
a (.080)
Segment rank within firm (1=largest) 0.070
a (.005) -0.069
a (.005)
Conglomerate*dependence*Quadrant 1 indicator -0.042 (.244) 0.085 (.203)
                        * Quadrant 2 Indicator:  Tech. Change 0.512
a (.177) 0.330
a (.120)
                        * Quadrant 3 Indicator:  Consolidating 0.555
a (.152) 0.779
a (.230)
                        * Quadrant 4 Indicator:  Growth 1.319
a (.440) 1.420
a (.412)
Average Plant-level Productivity of segment (lagged) 0.021 (.083) 0.022 (.083)
Diversity:  standard deviation of growth across segments -0.129 (.120) -0.047 (.068)
Number of Plants in Segment (lagged) 0.028
a (.002) 0.028
a (.002)
Quadrant 2 Indicator:  Tech. Change 0.020 (.150) 0.387 (.714)
Quadrant 3 Indicator:  Consolidating 0.171 (.116) 2.786
a (1.015)




Number of segment-years 408,430 408,430
Psuedo R-squared 14.96% 15.05%
a,b,c Significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, ten-percent level.
Regressions examine the relationship between plant acquisition, predicted financial dependence and firm organization.
Predicted dependence is the predicted probability of financial dependence using the specification of Table 3.   The 
growth (Consolidating, Technological Change) quadrant is when the change in real value of shipments is in the upper 
(upper, lower) fiftieth percentile and change in the number of firms is in the upper (lower, upper) fiftieth percentile of 
industries over 10 and 25 year periods.  Conglomerate firm status is the predicted probability using the specifications 
of Table 4.  Productivity of segment is the weighted average of plant-specific productivity for that segment.  All right-
hand-side variables represent values prior to the year of the acquisition.  Relative odds ratios, which represent a change 
in the relative odds of acquisition, can be obtained by taking the natural exponent of reported coefficients.  All 
regressions contain industry and year fixed effects.   (Robust standard errors that correct for autocorrelation within 
segments in parentheses).Table 6A:   Plant Acquisition in Growth Industries
Growth Industries
Dependent Variable:  Plant Acquisition Productivity-Split
  Bottom 50% Top 50%
Variables:






(.081) (.129) (.129) (.177) (.190)






(.063) (.080) (.081) (.116) (.113)











(.138) (.138) (.186) (.208)




Average Plant-level Productivity of segment (lagged 0.090
b 0.093
b 0.044 0.064 0.061
(.045) (.045) (.050) (.096) (.088)
Lagged number of plants -0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0079 0.0041
(.004) (.005) (.004) (.007) (.005)
Number of segment-years 185,281 185,281 185,281 92,106 93,175
Psuedo R-squared 21.8% 21.8% 21.8% 21.7% 22.3%
a,b,c 
Significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, ten-percent level.
Regressions examine the relationship between plant acquisition, predicted financial dependence and firm organization.   Predicted 
dependence is the predicted probability of financial dependence using the specification of Table 3.   Conglomerate firm status are the 
predicted probability using the specifications of Table 4.  Productivity of segment is the weighted average of plant-specific 
productivity residuals for that segment.  All independent variables represent values prior to the year of the acquisition.  Relative odds 
ratios, which represent a change in the relative odds of acquisition, can be obtained by taking the natural exponent of reported 
coefficients.  All regressions contain industry and year fixed effects.   (Robust standard errors that correct for autocorrelation within 
segments in parentheses).Table 6B:  Economic Significance
Predicted financial dependence at the
following percentiles: 10th 25th  50th 75th 90th
Declining Industries:  Quadrant 1
Multi-segment firms 4.38% 3.88% 3.52% 3.96% 4.54%
Single-segment 0.66% 0.41% 0.18% 0.10% 0.10%
Single-segment using medians of 3.49% 2.34% 1.11% 0.40% 0.19%
data from multi-segment firms
Growth Industries:  Quadrant 4
Multi-segment firms 6.08% 5.94% 6.26% 6.58% 7.30%
    Multi-segment firms: high-productivity segments 6.32% 6.15% 6.52% 7.07% 7.97%
Single-segment 0.69% 0.64% 0.57% 0.50% 0.44%
    Single-segment firms: high-productivity segments 0.65% 0.62% 0.57% 0.52% 0.49%
Single-segment using medians of 5.46% 4.95% 4.55% 4.10% 3.28%
data from multi-segment firms
Table presents predicted probabilities of a within-segment acquisition varying the predicted probability of 
financial dependence from the 10th to the 90th percentile.   All other variables are held at the sample medians 
for the respective subset of data (multi- and single-segment).  Predicted probabilities are calculated using 
coefficients from Table 6A, column 2, for growth industries and a similar specification for declining industries.  
High (low) productivity segments are segments above (below) the industry-year median.  Predicted probabilities 
for high productivity segments use coefficients from Table 6A, column 5.  The last row for each quadrant uses 
the medians of the data from the multi-segment firm subset but assume the firm is single segment, thus setting 
the multi-segment firm indicator equal to zero.Table 7:   Productivity Changes Post Acquisition
                             Industry Category  Years -1 to 1  Years -1 to 2  Years -1 to 3  Years -1 to 4
Declining Industries
   Plants purchased by Conglomerate Firms
       Average Productivity Change 0.007 0.009 0.029 0.052
b
       Standard Error (.020) (.023) (.025) (.027)
       Number of Plants 1,365 1,146 1,011 888
   Plants purchased by Single-Segment Firms
       Average Productivity Change 0.028 0.022 0.007 0.001
       Standard Error (.021) (.024) (.029) (.034)
       Number of Plants 1,057 882 690 552
Technological Change Industries
   Plants purchased by Conglomerate Firms





       Standard Error (.012) (.013) (.012) (.016)
       Number of Plants 3,681 3,305 2,980 2626
   Plants purchased by Single-Segment Firms
       Average Productivity Change -0.012 -0.029 -0.042
c -0.042
       Standard Error (.018) (.021) (.024) (.027)
       Number of Plants 1,554 1,289 1,004 822
Consolidating Industries
   Plants purchased by Conglomerate Firms
       Average Productivity Change 0.010 0.016 0.017 0.022
       Standard Error (.012) (.014) (.015) (.016)
       Number of Plants 3,400 3,006 2,710 2454
   Plants purchased by Single-Segment Firms
       Average Productivity Change 0.004 0.002 -0.012 -0.007
       Standard Error (.017) (.020) (.024) (.025)
       Number of Plants 1,829 1,458 1,167 941
Growth Industries
   Plants purchased by Conglomerate Firms





       Standard Error (.008) (.009) (.010) (.011)
       Number of Plants 8,016 6,922 6,068 5191
   Plants purchased by Single-Segment Firms
       Average Productivity Change 0.005 -0.025
b -0.018 0.007
       Standard Error (.011) (.012) (.015) (.017)
       Number of Plants 4,600 3,720 2,820 2186
a,b,c Significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, ten-percent level.
Table presents changes in plant productivity for years after plant acquisition.   Productivity is the sum of a firm 
fixed effect plus the residual from an estimated industry production function.  Changes in productivity are 
industry and year adjusted.  Declining (technological change, consolidation, growth) industries are industries 
that have long-run change in industry shipments over 1972-1987 in the lowest (lowest, highest, highest) fiftieth 
percentile and the long-run change in the number of firms in the lowest (highest, lowest, highest) fiftieth 
percentile.  (Standard error of mean in parentheses).Table 8:   Capital Expenditures
Dependent Variable:  Capital Expenditures / Lagged Capital Stock (Industry-Year Adjusted)
                             Industry Category  Declining Tech. Change Consolidation Growth
Variables:




(.057) (.018) (.028) (.028)
Conglomerate multi-industry indicator (predicted) 0.014 0.002 0.006 0.003
(.012) (.002) (.006) (.003)




(.013) (.004) (.015) (.013)





(.0004) (.0005) (.0003) (.0003)





(.006) (.002) (.012) (.011)










(.021) (.024) (.029) (.029)
Observations 92,282 74,472 68,869 195,266
Number of firm-industry segments 18,091 14,235 14,289 39,672
Adj. R-squared 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.26
a,b,c 
Significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, ten-percent level.
Logistic regressions examine the relationship between firm organization, predicted financial dependence and firm 
segment-level investment.  Predicted dependence is the predicted probability of dependence using the specification of
Table 3.  Conglomerate firm status is the predicted probability using the specifications of Table 4.   Productivity of 
plant is the plant-specific productivity.  Declining (technological change, consolidation, growth) industries are 
industries that have long-run change in industry shipments over 1972-1987 in the lowest (lowest, highest, highest) 
fiftieth percentile and the long-run change in the number of firms in the lowest (highest, lowest, highest) fiftieth 
percentile.  All regressions contain industry and year fixed effects.   (Robust standard errors that correct for 
autocorrelation within segments in parentheses).Table 9:   New Plants
Dependent Variable:  New Plant Opening
                             Industry Category  Declining Tech. ChangeConsolidation Growth
Variables:
Predicted financial dependence 0.023 0.119 -0.557
a -0.461
a
               standard error (.128) (.137) (.158) (.101)
               relative odds ratio  1.023 1.126 0.573 0.631





               standard error (.094) (.105) (.122) (.075)
               relative odds ratio  7.629 8.037 9.052 6.160
Conglomerate*predicted dependence -0.240 0.367 1.248
b 0.780
a
               standard error (.255) (.294) (.252) (.146)
               relative odds ratio  0.787 1.443 3.483 2.181





               standard error (.012) (.107) (.020) (.007)
               relative odds ratio  0.936 0.934 0.899 0.920
Average Plant-level Productivity of segment (lagged) 0.153
c 0.118 0.130 0.062
               standard error (.088) (.092) (.097) (.056)
               relative odds ratio  1.165 1.125 1.139 1.064





               standard error (.004) (.009) (.004) (.005)
               relative odds ratio  1.053 1.082 1.047 1.101
Number of segment-years 86,968 71,358 66,875 189,221
Number of firm-industry segments 18,210 14,322 14,473 39,891
Psuedo R-squared 0.124 0.130 0.144 0.125
a,b,c 
Significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, ten-percent level.
Logistic regressions examine the relationship between firm organization, predicted financial dependence and 
new plant openings.  Predicted dependence is the predicted probability of dependence using the specification of 
Table 3.  Conglomerate is the predicted probability that the firm produces in at least two different three-digit 
industries using the specification of Table 4.  Productivity of plant is the plant-specific productivity.  Declining 
(technological change, consolidation, growth) industries are industries that have long-run change in industry 
shipments over 1972-1987 in the lowest (lowest, highest, highest) fiftieth percentile and the long-run change in 
the number of firms in the lowest (highest, lowest, highest) fiftieth percentile.  (Robust standard errors in 
parentheses).  Odds ratios are the change in the relative likelihood of plant exit from a one unit increase in the 
variable.  Year and industry fixed effects are included.Table 10:   Plant Exit
Dependent Variable:  Plant Exit 
                             Industry Category  Declining Tech. Change Consolidation Growth
Variables:
Predicted financial dependence 0.187 0.031 -0.041 -0.200
               standard error (.166) (.232) (.174) (.123)
               relative odds ratio  1.206 1.031 0.960 0.819
Conglomerate multi-industry indicator (predicted) -0.080 -0.125 -0.428
a -0.509
a
               standard error (.139) (.166) (.139) (.090)
               relative odds ratio  0.923 0.882 0.652 0.601
Conglomerate*predicted dependence -1.255
a -0.345 -0.363 -0.120
               standard error (.325) (.358) (.371) (.215)
               relative odds ratio  0.285 0.708 0.696 0.887





               standard error (.004) (.005) (.005) (.003)
               relative odds ratio  1.045 1.030 1.045 1.031





               standard error (.015) (.016) (.016) (.011)
               relative odds ratio  0.691 0.643 0.680 0.641





               standard error (.001) (.001) (.001) (.002)
               relative odds ratio  1.009 1.008 1.004 1.015
Number of plant-years 151,247 115,495 128,401 276,658
Number of firm-industry segments 18,209 14,322 14,472 38,891
Psuedo R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
a,b,c 
Significantly different from zero at the one-, five-, ten-percent level.
Plant-level logit regressions examine the relationship between firm organization, predicted financial dependence 
and plant closing.  Predicted dependence is the predicted probability of dependence using the specification of 
Table 3.  Conglomerate firm status is the predicted probability using the specification of Table 4.  Declining 
(technological change, consolidation, growth) industries are industries that have long-run change in industry 
shipments over 1972-1987 in the lowest (lowest, highest, highest) fiftieth percentile and the long-run change in the 
number of firms in the lowest (highest, lowest, highest) fiftieth percentile.    Odds ratios are the change in the 
relative likelihood of plant exit from a one unit increase in the variable.   All regressions contain industry and year 
fixed effects.   (Robust standard errors that correct for autocorrelation within segments in parentheses).